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A B S T R A C T
Given the widespread adoption of renewable generation, storage and new loads like electric vehicle charging,
there has been a growing effort to enhance local energy resilience, particularly at the community level. This
has led to increasing interest in the development of local or community energy projects, in which individual
prosumers are able to generate, store and trade energy within the community — enabling a shift in market
power from large utility companies to individual prosumers. Such schemes often involve a group of consumers
investing in community-owned asset such as community-owned wind turbines or shared battery storage. Yet,
developing methods to enable efficient control and fair sharing of jointly-owned assets is a key open question,
of both research and practical importance. In this paper, we provide a method inspired from game theory
concepts to fairly redistribute the benefits from community owned energy-assets such as community wind
turbines and storage. We propose a heuristic-based battery control algorithm for maximization of behind-the-
meter self-consumption, which considers the effect of battery life degradation. Using real consumption and
production data to model a community of two hundred households, we assess and compare technical and
economic benefits of investment in individually-owned or community-owned assets such as chemical storage.
We show that battery storage simple pay-back period can be considerably reduced by sharing the asset within
a community. Finally, we compare several redistribution and benefit allocation schemes for community-owned
assets, and show that the proposed scheme based on principles from cooperative game theory achieves the
fairest redistribution.1. Introduction
The ongoing effort to tackle climate change and the drive towards
a low-carbon economy have led to an exponential growth in the de-
ployment of renewable energy sources (RES). In different countries
around the world, the rapid growth in RES has been facilitated by
technological advances in renewable energy generation and storage,
but also by financial incentives and ambitious policies that target
adoption of renewable energy [1].
In recent years, the number of distributed energy resources (DERs)
connected to the low voltage distribution network has rapidly in-
creased, partly due to the incentives offered (such as guaranteed feed-
in-tariffs (FITs)). This has led to interest in the development of a more
decentralized energy system, enabling a significant shift in market
power from large producers to individual prosumers (i.e. small-scale
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consumers with micro generation and/or storage). For Transmission
System Operators (TSOs) and Distribution System Operators (DSOs),
this trend means that generation and demand are more closely located,
which could enable more local resiliency to failures in the power system
if local flexibility such as storage is adequately incentivized.
While feed-in-tariffs support has led to fast embedded renewable
adoption (for example, a recent UK government report [2] showed
that after 5 years, FIT support led to over 6800 wind turbine instal-
lations, and over 600,000 solar PV ones, with a combined capacity of
over 3.5 GW), they are also a very expensive, and hence financially
unsustainable support mechanism in the long-term. As a consequence,
in many developed countries worldwide (such as the UK or the EU),
guaranteed FITs for renewable electricity generated by small DERs arevailable online 3 February 2021
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Subscripts and Sets
𝑖 for agents (households)
 for community
𝑗 for irregular battery cycles
𝑁 set of the number of agents (house-
holds)
𝑇 set of the number of time periods
𝐽 set of the irregular battery cycles
Parameters
𝜂𝑐 battery charging efficiency
𝜂𝑑 battery discharging efficiency
𝑆𝑜𝐶 initial initial battery 𝑆𝑜𝐶 [%]
𝑆𝑜𝐶max maximum battery 𝑆𝑜𝐶 [%]
𝑆𝑜𝐶min minimum battery 𝑆𝑜𝐶 [%]
DoD battery depth of discharge [%]
𝑝bat,max maximum power that battery can
charge/discharge [kW]
NcyclesDoD,max maximum allowable number of cycles
at specific DoD as per manufacturer
specification
𝜏𝑠(𝑡) selling price (export tariff) at 𝑡
[pence/kWh]
𝜏𝑏(𝑡) buying price (import tariff) at 𝑡
[pence/kWh]
𝑐𝐴𝑖 (𝑇 ) annualized cost of the asset for agent
𝑖, where 𝑇 = 1 year [£/kWh for
battery, and £/kW for wind turbine]
𝑐𝐴 (𝑇 ) annualized cost of the asset for com-
munity , where 𝑇 = 1 year [£/kWh




𝛥𝑡 duration of the time period 𝑡
𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡) battery state of charge at 𝑡 [%]
ncyclesDoD,regular/irregular number of regular or irregular cycles
at specific DoD
DFregular depreciation factor due to regular
cycle
DF𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑗 depreciation factor due to 𝑗th irregu-
lar cycle
𝑔wind/solar𝑖 (𝑡) power from the renewable generator
of agent 𝑖 at 𝑡 [kW]
𝑔wind/solar (𝑡) power from the renewable generator
of community  at 𝑡 [kW]
𝑝grid𝑖 (𝑡) power from the utility grid of agent 𝑖
at 𝑡 [kW]
𝑝grid (𝑡) power from the utility grid of commu-
nity  at 𝑡 [kW]
𝑝bat𝑖 (𝑡) power of the battery for agent 𝑖 at 𝑡
[kW], charging (−ve) and discharging
(+ve)
being phased out as a support mechanism, i.e. they are gradually re-
duced or are well below retail tariffs available from large operators [3].
For instance, in the UK, FITs are no longer available to producers of2
𝑝bat (𝑡) power of the battery for community
 at 𝑡 [kW], charging (−ve) and
discharging (+ve)
𝑑𝑖(𝑡) power consumed by the agent 𝑖 at 𝑡
[kW]
𝑑 (𝑡) power consumed by the community 
at 𝑡 [kW]
𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) energy exported by agent 𝑖 at 𝑡 [kWh]
𝑒𝑠 (𝑡) energy exported by community  at 𝑡
[kWh]
𝑒𝑏𝑖 (𝑡) energy imported by agent 𝑖 at 𝑡 [kWh]
𝑒𝑏 (𝑡) energy imported by community  at 𝑡
[kWh]
𝑏𝑖(𝑇 ) annual bill for agent 𝑖, where 𝑇 =
1 year [£]
𝑏0𝑖 (𝑇 ) baseline annual bill for agent 𝑖 with-
out any assets, where 𝑇 = 1 year
[£]
𝑏∗𝑖 (𝑇 ) new annual bill for agent 𝑖 after redis-
tribution of savings, where 𝑇 = 1 year
[£]
𝑏 (𝑇 ) annual bill for community , where
𝑇 = 1 year [£]
𝛱 (𝑇 ) saving of the community  after 1
year (𝑇 = 1 year) [£]
𝛩𝑖(𝑇 ) marginal contribution of an agent 𝑖
[£]
𝛤𝑖(𝑇 ) benefits redistributed to agent 𝑖 after
period 𝑇 [£]
Abbreviations
BESS Battery Energy Storage System
CEDRI Community-scale Energy Demand Re-
duction in India
CES Community Energy Storage
CESI UK National Centre for Energy Sys-
tems Integration
DERs Distributed Energy Resources
DF Depreciation Factor
DoD Depth of Discharge
DSM Demand Side Management
DSOs Distribution System Operators
EoL End of Life
FIT Feed-in Tariff
HEMS Home Energy Management System
HES Household Energy Storage




RES Renewable Energy System
RUL Remaining Useful Lifetime
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SoC State of Charge
ToU Time of Use
TSOs Transmission System Operators
any size since 31st March 2019 [4]. This has led to the emergence of
local or community energy systems where prosumers aim to maximize
behind-the-meter self-consumption from local renewable generation,





thereby reducing the need for both exports, but also imports and hence,
dependence on the central power grid. An energy community is made
up of a number of prosumers, who are defined to be consumers but
also producers [5]. Prosumer assets (renewable generation capacity and
storage) can be either distributed at individual households or central-
ized and thus shared within the community. A key research area in
this context is the development of appropriate community schemes and
control strategies for optimal scheduling of end-user production and
consumption. Therefore, there is an increasing interest from academics
and industry in community energy models for the optimization of
self-consumption [6] in community microgrids.
Recently, the number of deployed and planned community energy
projects has increased rapidly in the UK and worldwide. In the UK,
Community Energy Scotland (one of the largest organization involved
in developing community energy projects) lists more than 300 com-
munity energy projects [7]. An area of focus for policy makers is
empowering communities with the development of innovative and in-
tegrated local energy systems and networks as identified in the Scottish
Energy Strategy [8]. In a similar fashion, the UK government has com-
mitted to an extensive program to support community energy projects
to reduce, purchase, manage and generate energy by identifying clean
growth as one of the four grand challenges in the UK’s Industrial
Strategy [9]. These policy initiatives show that governments have
an instrumental interest in community energy and seek to facilitate
consumer-led, transformational and sustainable energy transitions. A
number of projects are looking at low-carbon decentralized energy
systems, including CESI (The UK National Centre for Energy Systems
Integration) [10] and the ReFLEX (Responsive Flexibility) project that
aims to develop a large-scale demonstrator for community energy
integration in Orkney, Scotland, UK [11]. Similar rising trends in smart
energy community initiatives can be seen across the United States (such
as the Brooklyn Microgrid project [12]), and across Europe (see [13]
for an overview).
The concept of energy communities is equally important – arguably
even more so – in developing countries, where access to central power
grid is limited or even non-existent, hence investments in community
energy projects provide an alternative way for consumers to gain access
to electricity. Examples of settings where households have limited and
sometimes no access to a central power grid include many communities
in sub-Saharan Africa [14] and even some in South Asia [15]. Given
the lack of central grid access, rural communities often form off-grid
or stand-alone microgrid energy systems, where communities invest in
local embedded micro-generation and storage assets to satisfy their en-
ergy needs. Hence, for such developing country settings, novel methods
to share the costs of investments, and also the benefits from community
energy projects (such as the ones we develop in this paper) are very rel-
evant. Community energy projects are seen as a way to reduce poverty,
stimulate the local economy and bring additional environmental, social
and financial benefits1 [17].
Given the above challenges, there is an urgent need for methods to
increase energy access, resilience and reliability of communities. One
way is for the community to invest in its own energy generation assets
like solar PV and wind turbine, and battery energy storage systems. But,
this raises the question of discovering benefits/drawbacks when invest-
ment in energy assets is performed individually or jointly on a com-
munity level. In other words, renewable generators and storage could
be installed either individually at a household level, or jointly-owned,
which all households in the community could use on a pre-agreed shar-
ing basis. A literature survey on previous techno-economic analyses of
1 Numerous energy projects deal with the issues of enabling resilient
nergy communities in developing countries. One such project that the authors
re involved with is CEDRI (Community-scale Energy Demand Reduction
n India) [16], a large-scale joint UK–India collaboration into smart energy
ystems.3
such schemes reveals that community-owned assets could provide more
savings (higher benefits) compared to distributed individually-owned
assets. A possible reason for better performance is due to identified
economies of scale in the community investment model, because of
better sizing (as it avoids over-sizing of individual units). Examples
of sharing of resources in energy communities are emerging peer-
to-peer (P2P) energy exchanges between prosumers but also energy
coalitions [18], where an aggregator or community energy operator
is responsible for managing and distributing the benefits from shared
assets to members of the community. One such successful scheme
is the ‘‘Ecovillage’’ of Findhorn in Scotland, UK [19]. An important
challenge that energy community schemes raise is the need for reaching
agreements that ensure fair allocation of revenues and benefits earned
by jointly-owned assets.
Another challenge is that management of energy community assets
consisting of renewable generation and storage (hybrid energy systems)
require careful consideration of assets’ cost, sizing and operation, such
as to maximize their Remaining Useful Lifetime (RUL), and hence
return on investment. Technically, for instance, the depth to which a
battery is discharged, the discharge current and the chemistry used has
a direct effect on its remaining useful lifetime. This translates into a
considerable impact on the total cost of operation and maintenance of
the battery, especially as energy storage is one of the most expensive
component of a hybrid energy system. Moreover, the frequent charging
and discharging operations leads to cyclic ageing and incurs an extra
cost as it accelerates the depreciation of the battery. Along with the fact
that batteries’ lifetime is comparatively shorter than that of renewable
generators, this highlights the importance of using an appropriate
battery control mechanism to extend the system’s useful life.
In most of the literature reviewed, studies show that the community
battery storage system offers higher benefits as compared to individual
household distributed batteries [3,20]. However, most of existing stud-
ies, to our knowledge, do not consider the battery degradation cost
when determining the optimal battery capacity. The battery lifetime
depends on the charge/discharge cycles, which in turn are shaped by
the control scheme. Thus, there is a need to accurately estimate the
depreciation of the battery from the operating profiles and therefore
assess the operational cost and overall economic value of the hybrid
renewable energy system.
Furthermore, although higher benefits can be achieved by investing
in community assets, how to redistribute these benefits among the indi-
vidual households in the community still remains a key open question,
of both research and practical interest. Hence, there is a significant
knowledge gap in how to design efficient and fair redistribution mech-
anisms to incentivize energy communities to invest in joint renewable
energy assets, especially when incorporating physical asset constraints
or the physical degradation during use of community assets.
In this paper, we provide a redistribution mechanism based on the
marginal contribution of an individual household in the benefits from
the community-owned assets, incorporating physical assets degrada-
tion. The mechanism proposed uses principles from mechanism design
and cooperative game theory. Game theory provides an insightful
analytical and conceptual framework along with mathematical tools to
study and analyse the complex interaction among independent rational
players (in our case the households) [21]. Cooperative (or coalitional)
game theory has been identified as a useful tool in designing incentive
mechanisms and business models in decentralized energy systems. In
a cooperative game, players form coalitions to maximize a common
objective for mutual benefit. Then, the benefit is distributed equally or
fairly among themselves using incentive-based solution concepts, such
as the Shapley value. One major challenge faced by community energy
scheme utilizing coalition game theory is the issue of scalability [18,
22]. Specifically, when determining the Shapley values in a coalition,
the computation becomes highly complex and time-consuming, as the
number of players increases in the coalition. To address this compu-
tational challenges, we propose in this work a more computationally
























tractable (and hence more practically applicable) redistribution mech-
anism based on the marginal contribution of each players. Another gap
identified in the literature, is that techno-economic analysis of individ-
ual versus community assets is mostly focused on battery and solar
PV only, and wind turbines have not been adequately investigated.
Inclusion of wind-battery systems though is very important, especially
in a country with remarkable wind resources like the UK.
Given the above challenges, in this paper we utilize real wind
and demand data over a full year and develop a mechanism for fair
redistribution of benefits from community assets (battery and wind
turbine) to individual prosumers. Findings of this work are related to
a number of strands including community energy system research and
cooperative game-theoretic applications for energy systems, but also to
the area of electrical engineering and physical asset health monitoring
of batteries. In more detail, the key contributions of our paper can be
summarized as follows:
• First, we provide a principled model of community investment
and sharing of energy assets, such as renewable generation and
battery storage for both fixed and dynamic time of use (ToU)
tariffs.
• Second, we incorporate physical battery degradation into com-
munity energy optimization models, including its effect on redis-
tribution schemes. To achieve this, we employ a battery state of
health degradation model based on the battery depth of discharge
in each control cycle.
• Third, we investigate and propose redistribution schemes for
sharing the benefits of community energy assets, based on princi-
ples from cooperative game theory, an established methodology
for designing redistribution schemes in a number of practical
domains [18,21]. These are assessed in different scenarios and
on a number of criteria, ranging from costs and financial benefits
to each prosumer, and correlation with intermittent renewable
output.
• Finally, we discuss the savings of the proposed redistribution
schemes for different sizes of prosumers, and assess their fair-
ness and effect of different redistribution schemes on potential
renewable uptake in energy communities.
The novelty of our work is twofold. First, the paper models the
ontrol of energy community assets from an economic and technical
erspective with an unprecedented level of detail, to the authors’ best
nowledge. This includes for example, incorporating real state-of-the-
rt battery control and degradation functions, using real commercially-
vailable, dynamic tariffs from the UK market, as well as a whole year
f high-granularity demand and renewable generation data. Second,
nspired by coalitional game theory methods, this paper provides a
ovel algorithm to fairly redistribute among community members the
enefits from community owned assets, which is shown to have desir-
ble redistribution and computational benefits, compared to existing
ethods for sharing output of community energy assets.
The rest of the paper is structured as: a review of different areas
f relevant prior literature is presented in Section 2. Single prosumer
odel along with the battery control algorithm, and deprecation model
s described in Section 3. Techno-economical analysis of individual
ersus community assets, and the various redistribution schemes of
enefits achieved from community assets is presented in Section 4.
inally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion and outlines some topics
or future work.
. Related work
Given the practical challenge that needs to be addressed, our work
ddresses several areas of research, discussed in the paragraphs below.
irst, we highlight state of the art research that model prosumers and
nergy communities with renewable generation and storage assets,
s this is the base of the work proposed in this paper. Then, we4
describe state of the art approaches for redistribution of benefits from
community owned assets among energy communities. We highlight
that there is currently a gap that could be filled with a fair and tractable
redistribution process for energy communities.
2.1. Prosumers and energy communities modelling
Home energy management system (HEMS) and prosumer optimization
for maximization of behind-the-meter self-consumption
In existing literature, self-consumption from renewable generators is
mostly achieved at individual household level through HEMS [23–25].
In most HEMS systems reviewed, matching of generation and demand
profiles is optimized through the integration of battery energy storage
systems (BESS) with demand side management (DSM) strategies and
flexible tariffs. Thus, BESS has become an indispensable asset in HEMS
for maximization of self-consumption, which is mostly defined in terms
of reduction of the energy bill. In the work of Golmohamadi et al. [26]
battery is integrated with HEMS to minimize the bill by reducing
the energy consumption of thermostatically controllable appliances.
Mehrjerdi et al. [27] proposed a unified HEMS that coordinates a
hybrid system of renewable generators (solar and wind), BESS, demand
response and flexible demand, including electrical and hydrogen ve-
hicles. It recommends that BESS should be optimally sized in order
to maximize self-consumption. Hemmati & Saboori [28] presented a
HEMS with optimal BESS scheduling for optimal utilization of solar PV
generation, while also taking into account the uncertainty associated
with solar irradiation. In the work of Castillo-Cagigal et al. [29], the
BESS is integrated with DSM to maximize the self-consumption from
solar PV generation. Various optimization techniques are applied by
HEMS to reduce energy bills. An extensive review on various optimiza-
tion techniques employed in HEMS is presented by Qayyum et al. [24]
and Beaudin & Zareipour [30].
Optimization and control incorporating the physical degradation of as-
sets, especially battery degradation models
Useful battery lifetime depends on the frequency of charging/
discharging and depth of discharge (DoD). Most existing and emerging
battery degradation models are focused in developing a methodology
for estimating the useful life of a battery due to cyclic degradation. Ke
et al. [31] have proposed an equivalent charge cycle estimation method
to evaluate the effect of providing the energy balancing service on bat-
tery life. Yan et al. [32] incorporated dynamic battery life degradation
in cost accounting model of energy storage system used for providing
grid frequency regulation in the ancillary services market. Similarly,
Ju et al. [33] proposed a hybrid energy storage system incorporating
the degradation cost of battery and supercapacitor based on DoD
and lifetime, while Xu et al. [34] developed a semi-empirical battery
degradation model that assesses battery-cell life loss from operating
profiles. In the work of Wang et al. [35], battery degradation and wind-
battery optimization models are integrated and used for operation and
bidding in real-time electricity markets. Recently, Terlouw et al. [36]
have proposed a multi-objective optimization framework for energy
arbitrage using community energy storage incorporating battery degra-
dation in the optimization problem. However, developing a detailed
battery degradation model for determining the optimal battery capacity
using real data, is still an open question. Furthermore, the need to
include battery degradation models in the real time decision process
of an Energy Management System has not been discussed until now.
Community energy schemes
As discussed in the introduction, several energy community projects
have been developed worldwide, including both in the UK and the EU.
For instance, Seyfang et al. [37] have conducted a detailed UK-wide
survey on energy community projects, and concluded that projects are
diverse and rapidly growing. Recently, community energy has gained
increased attention from a social perspective angle emphasizing on:
social innovations and dynamics [38], socio-technical energy transi-
tions [39], social entrepreneurship [40], grassroots innovation [41],
social acceptance and participation [42] and social investments [43].
Mendes et al. [44] have surveyed various optimization and simulation
Applied Energy 287 (2021) 116575S. Norbu et al.tools for the planning and operation of micro-grids and integrated
community energy systems. Batteries, along with renewable generators
(solar PV, wind turbine) are the most common assets considered in
community energy schemes.
Techno-economic comparisons between energy models with indi-
vidual prosumer assets and models with centrally-shared community
assets have recently gained increased attention in the literature. Most
of the studies focus on comparing battery storage adoption at the
individual household scale to storage adoption on the community scale.
Barbour et al. [20] have compared household energy storage (HES) to
community energy storage (CES). Their results show that the commu-
nity battery performs better compared to individual household batteries
as it requires less storage capacity overall and increases the self-
consumption rate. Similarly, techno-economic analysis of household
and community energy storage was assessed by Stelt et al. [3]. Here,
the CES was owned and operated by the utility company. The economic
value of both HES and CES was assessed by considering the cost of
energy imported from the grid. Results shows that economic feasibility
of both the HES and CES is largely determined by the investment
cost of the storage capacity per kWh. Similar assessment of household
level versus CES at grid-scale level is conducted by Sevilla et al. [45].
However, their study primarily focused on solving the issue of PV
curtailment.
Virtual community energy storage, similar to the concept of virtual
power plant (VPP), is proposed by Schlund et al. [46]. Individual house-
hold batteries are linked together to form a virtual community storage
aiming to improve self-consumption by minimizing imported power
from the grid, and thereby reducing the stress on the grid. Recently,
Koirala et al. [47] have provided an overview of the state of the art in
community energy storage. Similarly, an overview of the economic po-
tential and current research on community energy storage was outlined
by Sardi & Mithulananthan [48] and Strickland et al. [49]. The review
states that CES have huge potential to minimize the stress on the grid
by reducing import and maximizing self-consumption. However, to our
knowledge, previous works on techno-economic analysis of individual
vs. community assets, while considering both renewable generation and
batteries, have not included a battery degradation and control model
in their calculation. Moreover, there is still a need for mechanisms
designed to fairly redistribute the benefits from jointly-owned assets.
2.2. Benefits redistribution approaches
Coalitional game theory and redistribution mechanism in energy com-
munities
In the context of decentralized energy systems, coalitional game the-
ory has been identified as a promising solution for designing incentive
mechanisms for community energy trading and sharing. For instance,
Alam et al. [18] proposed an energy exchange mechanism in rural com-
munities that aimed to reduce battery usage and where approximated
Shapley value was used for the distribution of benefits among agents.
Recently, Tveita et al. [50] compared annual electricity cost allocation
among prosumers and consumers using solution concepts from cooper-
ative game theory. Both nucleolus and Shapley solution concepts were
used to determine the annual electricity cost deviations as key asset
parameters vary. While various operational scenarios were studied,
only four players were considered, thereby raising scalability issues
associated with increasing players and effects on coalition formation.
Similarly, Chakraborty et al. [51] investigated the sharing of storage
systems among consumers in a time of use (TOU) price set-up using
cooperative game theory. Sharing mechanism is designed based on the
solution concept of core and illustrated using only the five households
which raises the issue of the scalability and practicality as the house-
hold increases in the coalition. Moreover, the storage is considered
ideal thereby neglecting the degradation aspect of the battery. In the
work of Marzband et al. [52], cooperation among energy communities5
was studied in order to reduce the annual electricity cost, and profitFig. 1. Power flow diagram of the single prosumer model.
redistribution mechanisms were designed based on solution concepts
from coalitional game theory. Furthermore, Robu et al. [53] considered
coalition formation for minimizing group buying risk. Here, consumers
cooperate to form a group to buy electricity under one or several tariffs.
Lately, a blockchain-based coalitional formation algorithm for trading
energy was proposed by Thakur & Breslin [54]. Various community
energy trading schemes based on coalitional game theory can also be
found in [22,55–57]. One of the major challenges in redistribution
schemes based on coalition game theory is the issue of scalability.
Specifically, when determining the solution concepts such as Shapley
values in a coalition, the computation becomes highly complex and
time-consuming as the number of players increases in the coalition.
Thus, there is still a need to develop a redistribution mechanism that
is fair, but also computationally tractable and hence more practically
applicable.
To address these limitations, we propose a study that first as-
sesses the techno-economic benefits of community-owned energy assets
compared to individual energy assets. Then, using a methodology
from cooperative game theory, this paper proposes a new distribution
mechanism based on the marginal contribution that fairly shares these
benefits from community-owned assets. In order to assess the benefits
from community-owned assets including a comprehensive model of
battery degradation, we propose an approach based on real time-
series data of a community, and compare the benefits provided by
community-owned assets with the benefits expected from individual as-
sets. We start first by modelling each agent (prosumer) in a community,
as described in the following section.
3. Single prosumer study
In this section, we propose a comprehensive model of a single
prosumer, with the objective to determine the benefits a prosumer can
expect from owning a RES and/or a BESS.
3.1. Methodology
3.1.1. Model overview
The model of a single prosumer includes the following assets owned
by the prosumer:
1. Wind turbine or solar PV.
2. Battery.
3. Non-flexible loads.
A power flow diagram of the single prosumer model is shown in
Fig. 1. The overall power balance of the system at any given time 𝑡 is
given by:
grid bat wind/solar𝑝 (𝑡) = 𝑑(𝑡) − 𝑝 (𝑡) − 𝑔 (𝑡), ∀𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇 ] (1)















































where 𝑇 corresponds to the end of the considered time period for
the operation of the system. For example, if the operation window
[0, 𝑇 ] consists of a full calendar year with half-hourly time steps, then
|[0, 𝑇 ]| = 365 × 48 = 17520 time steps. 𝑔wind/solar(𝑡) is the power (or
energy as fixed time interval is considered) generated by the renewable
generator (either wind turbine or a solar PV installation). 𝑝grid(𝑡) repre-
sents the power that a prosumer can buy/sell power from/to the grid.
𝑝bat(𝑡) represents the power of the storage system, which is considered
negative when the battery is charging (battery considered as load),
and positive when the battery is discharging (battery considered as
generator). 𝑑(𝑡) is the power consumed by the prosumer.
The battery is used to store the excess power from the intermittent
power source (wind or solar). The prosumer demand 𝑑(𝑡) is considered
inflexible and needs to be satisfied at all times by these three power
sources (RES, BESS and the grid). The control algorithm for the battery
to meet the demand 𝑑(𝑡) with these three power sources is defined in
the following subsection.
3.1.2. Battery control algorithm
The operation of the battery is constrained by the state of charge
(SoC) levels, and a maximum power (𝑝bat,max) that the battery can be
charged or discharged at, which corresponds to its maximum C-rating.
At any given time 𝑡 of a charging phase, the battery is charged
with an efficiency (𝜂𝑐) until it reaches the maximum battery capacity
(𝑆𝑜𝐶max). Charging constraints are defined as:
𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡) ≤ 𝑆𝑜𝐶max (2)
𝑝bat(𝑡) ≤ 𝑝bat,max (3)
Similarly, the battery can be discharged with an efficiency (𝜂𝑑) until it
reaches its minimum battery capacity (𝑆𝑜𝐶min). Discharging constraints
are defined as:
𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡) ≥ 𝑆𝑜𝐶min (4)
𝑝bat(𝑡) ≤ 𝑝bat,max (5)
The minimum battery capacity corresponds to the maximum allowable
depth of discharge (DoD).
A battery control scheme consists of operational real-time decisions
to charge or discharge the battery. In this subsection, we propose a
heuristic-based battery control algorithm that aims to charge the battery
when there is excess of power, and discharge the battery when there is
a deficit of power. The algorithm can be described as follows:
If 𝑔wind/solar(𝑡) > 𝑑(𝑡), there is excess of power generated from the
intermittent source. The control strategy of the battery dictates the
following:
i Excess power is stored in the battery (charging operation).
ii If the battery is full or if available power is greater than the
maximum acceptable charging power, the prosumer sells the
excess power to the utility grid at a selling price equal to 𝜏𝑠(𝑡).
The resulting SoC profile and the energy exported 𝑒𝑠(𝑡) to the grid















𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜂𝑐𝑝bat(𝑡)𝛥𝑡 (7)
𝑒𝑠(𝑡) =
[
𝑔wind/solar(𝑡) − 𝑑(𝑡) − 𝑝bat(𝑡)
]
𝛥𝑡 (8)
where 𝛥𝑡 corresponds to the duration of the considered time step.
Similarly, if 𝑔wind/solar(𝑡) < 𝑑(𝑡), then there is a deficit in power
supplied by the intermittent source and the battery will operate as
follows:6
c
i Discharge the battery to meet the demand.
ii If the battery energy or power are not enough to compensate the
power deficit at this time step, the prosumer buys the remaining
deficit power from the utility grid at a buying price equal to 𝜏𝑏(𝑡).
Hence, the SoC profile and energy imported 𝑒𝑏(𝑡) from the utility grid












𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡 − 1) − 𝑆𝑜𝐶min
])
(9)






𝑑(𝑡) − 𝑔wind/solar(𝑡) + 𝑝bat(𝑡)
]
𝛥𝑡. (11)
A flowchart of the proposed control strategy is shown in Fig. 2.
lgorithm 1 outlines this heuristic if-then rule based control strat-
gy. The proposed control algorithm is generic in nature and can
e easily extended to incorporate decisions based on price signals,
lthough our extensive experiments showed that incorporating current
oU price signals in the algorithm did not provide greater benefits to
he prosumer.
The performance of the heuristic-based battery control strategy was
ompared with an optimization-based battery control [58] based on
ixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) that determines the optimal
attery schedules for a future period (day-ahead for example) based on
orecasts of future renewable generation, demand and electricity prices.
ig. 3 shows the comparison of the bill of a prosumer for different
attery control algorithms, such as the proposed heuristic based algo-
ithm (in yellow), and 2 optimization based control algorithms with
ifferent time horizon. One can see that the longer the optimization
ime horizon is, the better the control decisions will be. However, this
oes not include the risk of forecast uncertainties.
Hence, results show that in the case of electricity import prices
𝑏(𝑡) always greater than electricity export prices 𝜏𝑠(𝑡), heuristic-based
attery control and optimization-based battery control for arbitrage give
omparable benefits to the prosumer, yet with a much greater com-
lexity and uncertainty observed for the optimization-based battery
ontrol algorithm. Therefore, the rest of our study only considered the
euristic-based battery control scheme.
.1.3. Battery degradation model
To determine the economic viability of hybrid power systems that
nclude battery energy storage system, it is important to assess the
epreciation (degradation) of the battery, since the battery lifespan is
uch shorter than the one of other assets such as renewable genera-
ors [34,35]. The useful battery lifetime depends on the frequency of
harge/discharge cycles, and on the depth of discharge (DoD) [32,59].
ndeed, frequent deep charging and discharging operations lead to
yclic ageing inflicting additional costs, as the depreciation of the
attery is accelerated [60]. Thus, there is a need to accurately estimate
he depreciation of the battery to assess the operational cost and overall
conomic value of the battery energy storage system.
Calendar life refers to the number of years a battery is expected to
ast until it reaches its end of life (EoL). EoL is normally defined as a
tate of the battery when the maximum capacity of the battery reduces
o 80% of its rated initial capacity. It is independent of its cycling
ehaviour, and thus it is normally regarded as constant [60]. Predom-
nantly, the service life of the battery usually degrades when subjected
o repeated charge/discharge cycles. Furthermore, battery life not only
epends on total number of cycles, but also to the depth of discharge
DoD) of the cycles as specified by the manufacturers. Therefore, most
f the emerging and existing battery degradation models assess the
seful life of a battery by considering cyclic degradation [31–35,60–
2].
A battery cycle life corresponds to the number of charge/discharge
ycles the battery can undergo based at a certain DoD as specified by
Applied Energy 287 (2021) 116575S. Norbu et al.Fig. 2. Flowchart of heuristic-based battery control strategy.Algorithm 1: Heuristic-based battery control algorithm
1 Input1: generation 𝑔wind/solar(𝑡), demand 𝑑(𝑡), and grid price:𝜏𝑏(𝑡),𝜏𝑠(𝑡)
2 Input2: battery specifications: 𝜂𝑐 , 𝜂𝑑 , 𝑆𝑜𝐶 initial, 𝑆𝑜𝐶max, 𝑆𝑜𝐶min, 𝑝bat,max, rated capacity of the battery as variable input
3 for 𝑡 = 1 ∶ 𝑇 do
4 ∀𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇 ], excess of energy or deficit in energy is determined
5 if 𝑔wind/solar(𝑡) ≥ 𝑑(𝑡) then














7 𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜂𝑐𝑝bat(𝑡)𝛥𝑡
8 𝑒𝑠(𝑡) =
[














𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡 − 1) − 𝑆𝑜𝐶min
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15 Output: ∀𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇 ], 𝑆𝑜𝐶(𝑡), input to rainflow cycle counting algorithm used to calculate the battery depreciation factor, 𝑒𝑠(𝑡) energy
exported to grid at a selling price equal to 𝜏𝑠(𝑡), and 𝑒𝑏(𝑡) energy imported from grid at a buying price equal to 𝜏𝑏(𝑡).the manufacturer. Typically, the number of cycles in a battery lifetime
versus the cycle’s DoD is specified in the battery data sheet as shown
in Fig. 4. For instance, if the total number of permitted battery cycles
is 2000 with 80% DoD, it means that every cycle from 100% state
of charge (SoC) to 20% SoC consumes 1/2000 = 0.05% of the total
life. Fig. 4 shows that, as the DoD of the charging/discharging cycle
increases, the expected cycle-life of the battery decreases. This means,
a battery that is exposed to shallow charging/discharging cycles is
expected to have a longer cycle-life than the battery that is exposed to
deeper discharges [61]. It is important to note that the number of cycles
versus DoD curve provided by manufacturers is obtained at specific
temperature and C-rating.
A cycle is defined to have been completed when the battery depth
of discharge has returned to the starting point of the cycle. We can
distinguish full cycles that consist in equal discharging and charging
depth or half cycles that consist in either a charging or discharging
phase. We can also distinguish regular and irregular cycles, depending7
on the starting and ending SoC of the cycle, as defined below: t• Regular cycles: in this cycling process the starting SoC is 100%,
then it is discharged to a certain SOC corresponding to a specific
DoD and recharged back to 100% SoC. For example, 100% SoC-to
−50% SoC-back to 100% SoC corresponds to 50% DoD cycle.
• Irregular cycles: in this case, the starting SoC is not other than
100% SoC, i.e. cycles start at any arbitrary SoC value. For ex-
ample, 80% SoC-to −30% SoC-back to 80% SoC, which also
corresponds to a 50% DoD cycle, relatively to the starting SoC.
In both cases, the DoD may be same, but the battery degradation is
sensitive to the starting SoC. Note here that the number of cycles versus
DoD specified in manufacturer data-sheets are based on regular cycles
only. In real-life applications, the battery can hardly run regular cycles
from 100% SoC to a specific DoD [31,35]. Thus, an important aspect
when integrating battery storage degradation in the economic analysis
of a prosumer, is to assess the impacts of irregular cycles.
In this paper, a rainflow cycle counting algorithm [63,64] is adopted
o count half and full cycles. Then, the algorithm is further modified
Applied Energy 287 (2021) 116575S. Norbu et al.Fig. 3. Comparison of the annual bill achieved for a prosumer using optimization based and heuristic based control algorithms for batteries capacities ranging from 0 to 20 kWh.Fig. 4. Lithium-ion battery life cycle data used in the modelling based on data from [34].to determine regular and irregular cycles. This algorithm was initially
proposed by Socie and Downing [63] for material fatigue estimates,
and has been widely used for extraction of full or partial cycles in
battery degradation models [31,34,35,60,65]. In this paper, we only
consider Lithium-ion battery technology and used the battery cycle life
data from [34]. Fig. 4 shows the number of cycles, noted 𝑁cycles, that
a battery cell can perform before the battery capacity reduces to 80%
of its initial capacity.
The input to the rainflow cycle counting algorithm is the SoC profile
resulting from the simulated operation of Algorithm 1. Outputs include
the number of cycles the battery experienced, which are classified by
type (full or half cycles, regular or irregular) [34]. The number of cycles
is also classified by their DoD and starting/ending SoC.
The depreciation factor (DF) is then determined to estimate the8
battery lifetime. The expression of the battery depreciation factor fora certain operating period can be expressed as follows:
DF = DFregular + DFirregular (12)
where DFregular and DFirregular correspond to the depreciation factor for
regular and irregular cycles respectively. When the Depreciation Factor
value is equal to 1, this means the battery remaining capacity is below
80%, hence the battery needs to be replaced.








where 𝑛DoD,regular𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 corresponds to the number of regular cycles at the
specific DoD experienced during operation, and 𝑁DoD,max is the number𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠









































































of permitted regular cycles in the life time of the battery (for a specific
DoD) as specified by the battery manufacturer and shown in Fig. 4.
For, irregular cycles the depreciation factor is calculated with the
following process, inspired from the work of Ke et al. [31]. Irregular
cycles start from a state of charge 𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 different than 100% and
nd at a state of charge 𝑆𝑜𝐶𝐸𝑛𝑑 . The depreciation factor (𝐷𝐹 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑗 )
ue to one irregular cycle 𝑗 from 𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 to 𝑆𝑜𝐶𝐸𝑛𝑑 is then given by:




































𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 corresponds to the maximum number of





corresponding to a fictitious cycle starting at





















2 , for half cycle
1, for a full cycle
(16)






here 𝐽 is the set of all irregular cycles.
.1.4. Economic study of residential batteries
The aim of the economic study for a single prosumer is to deter-
ine the conditions that make the battery most profitable. To achieve
his goal, the presented algorithm 1 is implemented using different
arameters (battery characteristics, prices, production and demand
ime-series) that can be changed in order to realize a sensitivity study
n the profitability of a battery at a prosumer level. The resulting bills
or a single prosumer are then compared in order to identify what
arameters have the greatest impact on the battery profitability.
Broadly speaking, the yearly bill of a prosumer 𝑏(𝑇 ) can be ex-
ressed as the sum of the cost of the annual energy consumption, sum
f revenues earned by exports to the grid and the depreciation cost of









𝑒𝑠(𝑡)𝜏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝐴(𝑇 ) (18)
here the energy import 𝑒𝑏(𝑡) at time step 𝑡 is given by Eq. (11), and
he energy export 𝑒𝑠(𝑡) at time step 𝑡 is given by Eq. (8). However, as
any countries have reduced or removed export prices under the form
f feed-in tariffs, our analysis will not include revenues from energy





𝑒𝑏(𝑡)𝜏𝑏(𝑡) + 𝑐𝐴(𝑇 ). (19)
n Eqs. (18) and (19), 𝑐𝐴 represents the depreciation cost which is due
o the usage of the asset within the considered period. For example,
or a considered period 𝑇 equal to one year in which the asset is used
ollowing the manufacturer’s recommendations, 𝑐𝐴(𝑇 ) corresponds to
he annualized cost of the asset, given as follows:
𝑐𝐴(𝑇 ) = Asset costLife time (in years) . (20)
Taking into consideration the depreciation inflicted by battery op-
ration and control algorithm 1, the computation of the depreciation
ost 𝑐𝐴 must be updated as follows:









.2. Experimental results for the case of a single prosumer
.2.1. Model data input
.2.1.1. Wind speed and power model data. Real wind data from the UK
et Office Integrated Data Archive System (MIDAS) [66] provided by
ritish Atmospheric Data Centre (BADC) is used for the analysis. The
IDAS dataset consist of meteorological observations from weather
tations located at various parts of the UK. Wind data from the Kirkwall
irport weather station located in Orkney, Scotland was specifically
hosen to align with the objective of setting a community local energy
ystem.
Wind data obtained consist of hourly mean wind speed measured
rom anemometers at a nominal height of 26 m above the ground,
ounded to the nearest knot (1 Kn = 0.5144 m/s). Wind data is cleaned
and the missing data is replaced by double spline interpolation func-
tion. Similar methods adopted by Fruh [67,68] and Andoni et al. [69]
are applied for converting wind speed to power.
A power curve is adopted based on an Enercon E-33 [70] wind
turbine of 330 kW rated capacity and a hub height of 50 m. The
wind turbine has cut-in speed of 3 m/s and cut-out speed of 25 m/s.
Logarithmic shear profile is used to extrapolate wind speed in m/s from










where, 𝑈ℎ is the wind speed at hub height, 𝑈𝑎 is wind speed at
anemometer height and 𝑍𝑜 is the surface roughness. 𝑍𝑎 = 26 m, 𝑍ℎ =
50 m and the surface roughness 𝑍0 = 0.03 m (as adopted in [67–69])
are used in estimating the wind speed at hub height.
The power curve of the Enercon E-33 wind turbine is used in esti-
mating the power output of the wind turbine, and the generated power
is normalized to the rated capacity or nominal power output. Then,
the intermediate values of the estimated power are approximated by a
sigmoid function with parameters 𝑎 = 0.7526 s/m and 𝑏 = 8.424 m/s as
per the Eq. (23).
𝑓 (𝑢, 𝑎, 𝑏) = 1
1 + 𝑒−𝑎(𝑢−𝑏)
(23)
ind power estimated in kW is converted to W and one hour resolution
ata is converted to half hourly data (using double spline interpolation
unction). Conversion of wind power was performed to make it com-
atible with the resolution of demand data. The wind power estimated
rom the power curve of the Enercon E-33 wind turbine is shown in
ig. 5.
.2.1.2. Demand profile data. Real demand data provided by the
hames Valley Vision End Point Monitor [71] project was used for the
nalysis. The dataset includes consumption data for 220 UK Elexon
rofile class-1 and class-2 customers. Demand data consist of half
ourly consumption load in Watts (W). In this paper, the demand
ataset for 200 houses of class-1 profile, which corresponds to domestic
nrestricted customers, was used for the prosumer model. The range
f demand across the 200 prosumers varies from a household with
he lowest annual consumption of 1001 kWh to the highest annual
onsumption of 18736 kWh. A typical daily load curve of a prosumer
ith annual consumption of 1833 kWh is shown in Fig. 6. The daily
oad curve varies with a peak load of 199 W, average load of 105 W
nd a minimum load of 37 W.
.2.1.3. Tariff structure data. A pricing scheme was considered only
or the imported energy from the grid, while no feed-in tariff was
onsidered (zero export tariff to grid). Two types of pricing schemes,
flat tariff and a dynamic time of use (ToU) tariff were considered. A
lat tariff of 16 pence/kWh was adopted after comparing current flat
lectricity tariff prices offered by various electricity suppliers based











Fig. 5. Power curve of Enercon E-33 wind turbine and best sigmoid fit function based on Eq. (23).Fig. 6. Typical daily variations of the demand for a prosumer with annual consumption of 1833 kWh.n UK, using [72]. The dynamic ToU tariff was based on Agile Octo-
us [73] offered by Octopus Energy, a UK-based electricity supplier.
gile Octopus tariff consist of a maximum price of 35 pence/kWh, an
verage price of 15.9 pence/kWh, and a minimum of 2.8 pence/kWh.
oth the flat and dynamic ToU pricing schemes corresponds to real
ariffs applied in 2019.
.2.2. Optimal sizing of the battery and sensitivity analysis
Optimal battery sizing: using the billing expression defined in
q. (19), we can determine the optimal battery capacity that minimizes
q. (19) by running a sensitivity analysis on the battery capacity.
To illustrate the sensitivity analysis, we considered a prosumer10
ith an annual demand of 18736 kWh, 1.8 kW rated wind generator,and different battery capacities ranging from 0 to 35 kWh capacity.
The tariff considered was a flat grid import tariff of 16 pence/kWh,
adopted after comparing the fixed electricity prices offered by various
UK-based electricity suppliers using web-tools in price comparison site
Money Supermarket [72], without feed-in tariff. The simulation was
performed for one year. A battery cost of 150 £/kWh was assumed
in this work based on 2019 Lithium-ion battery forecasts estimated
by BloombergNEF [74,75]. According to BloombergNEF [75] and PV
Europe-Energy Storage [76], battery costs are expected to drop even
further in the following years with an estimated cost of less than
$100/kWh expected in 2023. The chosen battery cost of 150 £/kWh for
the year 2019 is consistent with the Lithium-ion battery cost forecasts
for 2020 and 2025 published in the McKinsey quarterly report [77].










Fig. 7. Annual bill versus battery capacity for prosumer with annual demand of 18736 kWh simulated for the flat grid import tariff of 16 pence/kWh [72].cost of 1072 £/kW for wind generation capacity was assumed based
n the development and installation cost of wind turbine according to
IA, Annual Energy Outlook 2020 [78]. This cost reflects the average
alues of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) and levelized avoided cost
f electricity (LACE) for wind power generating technologies entering
ervice in 2022, 2025 and 2040. Fig. 7 shows the evolution of the bill as
function of the battery capacity and shows that the optimal capacity
n this particular case, is close to the battery capacity of a Tesla battery.
n addition, the annual bill is reduced by almost £90.
Sensitivity analysis of the battery cost: the cost of the battery and
electricity prices are important parameters that affect the profitability
of a battery. Fig. 8 shows the evolution of the annual bill of a prosumer
as a function of the size of the battery that the prosumer buys and for
different battery costs. Simulation results clearly show that there is an
optimal battery capacity that minimizes the annual bill, although the
benefit in terms of bill reduction highly depends on the battery cost.
Furthermore, one can see that the higher the cost of batteries is, the
smaller the optimal battery capacity is. This information is extremely
useful as it allows a company to size a prosumer’s battery based on
their particular consumption and production profiles. Nevertheless, it
is worth noting that the bill reduction is still quite low (£183) even in
the most advantageous case of a battery cost of 50 £/kWh.
Sensitivity analysis of the electricity price: the grid buying elec-
tricity price (𝜏𝑏) is the third parameter included in the economic
analysis of the battery. To realize the sensitivity analysis on the elec-
tricity price, we selected a scenario with a battery cost of 150 £/kWh,
as recommended in [74]. The baseline electricity buying price is the
flat grid import tariff of 16 pence/kWh, adopted after comparing the
fixed electricity prices offered by various UK-based electricity suppliers
using web-tools in price comparison site Money Supermarket [72].
This website is one of the several price comparison sites approved and
accredited by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) [79],
the government regulator for the electricity and downstream natural
gas markets in UK. The chosen baseline electricity buying price from
grid is consistent with the average cost for the standard electricity in the
UK as per the quarterly energy prices, quarter 1 (January–March) 2019
report [80] published by Department of Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy [81]. Similar flat rate is adopted in the works of Zhou et al. [5],
and Luth et al. [82]. To conduct the study, different scenarios were11analysed, each one corresponding to a specific electricity buying price,
as shown in Fig. 9. The simulation results shows that annual bills
increase with the increase in electricity price. This increase in annual
bills is expected as the prosumer spends more money to satisfy his
electricity consumption.
Results show that the higher the price of electricity is, the more
advantageous it is to install a battery system. For instance, for the
scenario of a buying price equal to 24 pence/kWh, the decrease in
annual bill is £200 with an optimal battery size of 18 kWh, while it is
£15 in the case of a buying price of 8 pence/kWh and a battery capacity
of 5 kWh.
Thus, this study shows that the increase of electricity prices along
with the decrease of battery costs can make batteries profitable for
prosumers. Furthermore, as shown in Figs. 7–9, increasing the battery
capacity too much will increase the annual bill. Indeed, if a prosumer
buys a battery that is much larger than the required size, the extra
capacity will not be used, and will correspond to a loss of revenue.
Finally, the simulations show that with current market prices, the
batteries are not profitable for most prosumers, unless economic param-
eters such as the battery cost and electricity price change, as it might be
expected in the next decade [74]. The result is similar to the findings by
Stelt et al. [3], who concluded that the economic feasibility of batteries
depends largely on the battery cost, and that the current battery cost is
found to be economically infeasible. However, it is worth noting that in
our model, we have not considered any benefits obtained from energy
or grid services that could be provided by the battery, such as frequency
and demand response services.
4. Energy community configuration
In this section, we provide a comparative study of benefits provided
by DERs and BESS to prosumers between a scenario where every pro-
sumer installs his own assets, which corresponds to the case presented
in Section 3, and a scenario where prosumers join together to invest in
community assets. Furthermore, we provide a novel approach to share
the revenues generated by community assets to the members of the
community.










4.1.1. Energy community modelling
In this scenario, we consider a community of 200 prosumers with
real half hourly demand profiles based on the dataset provided by
the Thames Valley Vision End Point Monitor [71] project. These 200
demand profiles are further aggregated [20] to represent a single
community demand profile. A community is formed by connecting
all individual prosumers or individual agents into a system that is
collectively referred to as a multi-agent system.
Specifically, for an agent 𝑖 with 𝑖 = 1…𝑁 and 𝑁 = 200 in our case,
𝑔𝑖(𝑡) represents the generation from the intermittent renewable source
and 𝑑 (𝑡) the demand at time 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇 ]. The energy bill of agent 𝑖 at time12
𝑖 w𝑡 is represented by 𝑏𝑖(𝑡), whereas if the considered period 𝑇 is equal
o one year, then 𝑏𝑖(𝑇 ) represents the total annual bill as outlined by
q. (19).
The community , i.e. the set of all agents 𝑖, is formally defined
s  =
{
𝐴𝑖 | 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑁]
}
where 𝑁 = 200 agents. Accordingly, 𝑔 (𝑡) and
 (𝑡) represent the generation and demand of the community  at time
. Similarly, the community bill at time 𝑡 is represented by 𝑏 (𝑡), and
he annual bill is given by 𝑏 (𝑇 ).
The model inputs, battery control algorithm 1, battery depreciation
spects and the economic setting of the single prosumer model de-
cribed in Section 3 are applied to the community setting. We consider
enewable generation from wind as outlined in Section 3.2.1.1 along
ith a battery energy storage system. The cost of energy assets are








































































assumed to be 150 £/kWh for the battery [74], and 1072 £/kW for the
wind turbine [78]. As outlined by Eq. (19), the annual bill for agent 𝑖






𝑏(𝑡) + 𝑐𝐴𝑖 (𝑇 ). (24)





𝑏(𝑡) + 𝑐𝐴 (𝑇 ). (25)
here, 𝑒𝑏𝑖 (𝑡)𝜏
𝑏(𝑡) is the cost of energy imports from the utility grid by
gent 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝑐𝐴𝑖 (𝑇 ) is the depreciation cost of assets owned by
gent 𝑖 in the considered period 𝑇 . Similarly, 𝑒𝑏 (𝑡)𝜏
𝑏(𝑡) is the cost of
nergy imported from the utility grid by the community as a whole at
ime 𝑡 and 𝑐𝐴 (𝑇 ) is the depreciation cost of community assets for the
onsidered period 𝑇 .
.1.2. Mechanism for a fair redistribution of benefits achieved from com-
unity shared assets
Community assets lead to a reduction in the electricity bills of all
he members of the community. However, this raises the key question
f how these financial benefits from the joint assets can be fairly shared
etween agents. In this section, we propose a new methodology for
air redistribution of cost savings from community energy assets that
tilizes the marginal contribution principle, often used in cooperative
ame theory.
Savings of the community after one year (𝑇 = 1 year), noted as
 (𝑇 ), are defined by the difference between the sum of all agents
nnual bills before the community assets were installed (which corre-
ponds to the baseline scenario shown in Table 1), and 𝑏 (𝑇 ) i.e. the
nergy bill for the whole community after one year with community
ssets. Hence, the community savings over time period 𝑇 correspond to
he bill reduction for the whole community over that period, as shown
elow:




𝑏0𝑖 (𝑇 ) − 𝑏 (𝑇 ) (26)
here 𝑏0𝑖 (𝑇 ) is the baseline bill for prosumer 𝑖 before any asset was
nstalled, which corresponds to the values displayed in Table 1. In
rder to compute a fair redistribution of the community savings among
he individual agents, we propose to compute the contribution 𝛩𝑖(𝑇 )
f each agent to these community savings. To compute the marginal
ontribution of an agent 𝑖, we remove agent 𝑖 from the community of
00 agents (total community), and recompute the community savings
onsisted of 199 agents (reduced community). The marginal contribu-
ion 𝛩𝑖(𝑇 ) of agent 𝑖 is defined as the difference between the total
ommunity savings 𝛱 (𝑇 ) and the savings of the reduced community
⧵{𝑖}(𝑇 ), as shown below:
𝛩𝑖(𝑇 ) = 𝛱 (𝑇 ) −𝛱⧵{𝑖}(𝑇 ) ∀𝑖 ∈  (27)
here  is the community of 200 households. Once the marginal con-
ribution 𝛩𝑖(𝑇 ) is computed for all the agents, we distribute community
avings 𝛱 (𝑇 ) among the individual agents based on the following
quation:




∀𝑖 ∈  (28)
where 𝛤𝑖(𝑇 ) is the amount of money redistributed to agent 𝑖 after period
𝑇 .
Hence, the new bill of agent 𝑖 for the time period 𝑇 , noted 𝑏∗𝑖 (𝑇 ) can
e computed as follows:
𝑏∗𝑖 (𝑇 ) = 𝑏
0
𝑖 (𝑇 ) − 𝛤𝑖(𝑇 ) ∀𝑖 ∈  (29)
ntuitively explained, the marginal contribution 𝛩𝑖(𝑇 ) of agent 𝑖 repre-
ents the difference that an agent makes to the value of a given coalition
n the community. Specifically, the marginal contribution 𝛩𝑖(𝑇 ) is a
etric that help us understand how much each agent 𝑖 contributes to13able 1
aseline scenario: the sum of individual agents yearly bills and community yearly bill
ithout the assets (wind turbine and battery) for both the flat tariff of 16 pence/kWh
72] and dynamic Agile Octopus ToU tariff [73].
Without assets (baseline) Flat tariff Agile Octopus tariff
Annual bill (£) Annual bill (£)
Sum of individual agents yearly bills 134455 143923
Community yearly bill 134455 143923
the reduction of the energy bill and overall community savings, leading
to an equal and fair redistribution of savings as shown by Eq. (29).
Existing coalitional game theory redistribution mechanism based on
solution concepts like the Shapley value use marginal contributions at
their core, but present issues of scalability as the number of agents
in a coalition increases. Particularly, computing the Shapley value is
computationally challenging [18,83], as it requires the computation of
the marginal contribution of each agent to every possible subset of a
given coalition. The proposed redistribution mechanism 𝛤𝑖(𝑇 ) is faster
as it computes only the marginal contribution 𝛩𝑖(𝑇 ) of an agent 𝑖 with
espect to the grand coalition, therefore it scales better as the number of
gents increases. The proposed sharing mechanism refereed as Method
based on marginal contribution, is aligned with the fundamental
oncept of cooperative game theory that concentrates on the division of
ayoffs from the community coalition, and not so much on what agents
o to achieve those payoffs.
.2. Experimental results
.2.1. Comparison of individual and energy community schemes
Energy communities are able to maximize the behind-the-meter self-
onsumption by investing in the individual or joint community-shared
enewable energy assets. In order to assess the most profitable invest-
ent options, the benefits (savings) obtained from the investment in
he distributed individually-owned assets are compared to the benefits
btained from the investment in the community-shared assets. The
early savings are determined by comparing annual bills after investing
n the assets (as described by Eqs. (24) and (25)) with the yearly bills
efore the assets were installed (i.e. without assets).
First, we define a baseline scenario. In this baseline scenario, yearly
ills for individual agents and the community are computed without
eneration or storage assets (DER and BESS) for both the flat tariff of 16
ence/kWh [72] and dynamic Agile Octopus ToU tariff [73]. Table 1
hows the community annual bill (𝑏 (𝑇 )) and the sum of individual
gents annual bills (∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑏𝑖(𝑇 ), where 𝑁 = 200). It can be observed
hat without these local assets, annual bills are equal, which can be
xpected as the community represents the aggregated demand profiles
f the individual agents. This baseline scenario is used for comparing
he savings (benefits) from investing in generation and storage.
• Individual wind turbines versus community wind turbine
First, we compare the benefits provided by a community DER to
the benefits provided by distributed DER, without considering any
storage system. In this scenario, only the investment cost of the
wind turbine is considered. Also, we assume the operations of the
DER follow the manufacturer operations. Hence, the depreciation
cost of the wind turbine operation is not included. We also assume
that every prosumer owns a wind turbine with a rated power
equal to the optimal rated power for this prosumer, which is the
most conservative scenario for individual wind turbines. Optimal
rated capacity of the wind turbine corresponds to that rated
power that achieves the minimum annual bill given by Eqs. (24)
and (25). Simulations are performed for one year, without a
battery energy storage system, and for both flat and ToU pricing
schemes.
The sum of individual agents optimal wind turbine capacities and
the corresponding sum of individual annual bills are determined.
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Sum of individual agents optimal wind turbine capacities, sum of individual agents annual bills, and
community optimal wind turbine capacity and corresponding annual bill for both the flat tariff of 16
pence/kWh [72] and dynamic Agile Octopus ToU tariff [73].
Assets
Flat tariff Agile Octopus tariff
Optimal capacity
(kW)
Annual bill (£) Optimal capacity
(kW)
Annual bill (£)
Sum of individual agents
optimal wind turbines
484 76339 518 80543
Community optimal wind
turbine
405 64792 456 68448Table 3
Sum of individual agents optimal battery capacities, sum of individual agents annual bills, and community
battery capacity and corresponding annual bill for both the flat tariff of 16 pence/kWh [72] and dynamic
Agile Octopus ToU tariff [73].
Assets
Flat tariff Agile Octopus tariff
Optimal capacity
(kWh)
Annual bill (£) Optimal capacity
(kWh)
Annual bill (£)
Sum of individual agents
optimal batteries
1596 63158 1723 64877
Community optimal
battery
1342 57389 1690 59136Similarly, the community optimal wind turbine capacity and the
corresponding annual bill are determined. Results are shown in
Table 2.
As it is shown by the results, the community wind turbine pro-
vides more savings (higher benefits) compared to distributed
individually-owned wind turbines. These results highlight mul-
tiple advantages that can be obtained by investing in the com-
munity wind turbine. Firstly, a community wind turbine requires
a substantially lower optimal capacity for the same services.
Secondly, lower annual bill is achieved by investing in the com-
munity wind turbine for both the flat tariff and dynamic ToU
tariff.
• Individual batteries versus community battery
In this scenario, we assume that agents invest in battery storage
systems, and compare the benefits of individual versus commu-
nity batteries. The wind power rating for individuals and for the
community are the optimal ratings obtained in the previous sce-
nario with wind turbines only. Similarly, we assume each agent
(individuals or the community) invest in a battery of the optimal
size, as described in Section 3.2.2. Furthermore, we consider
investment costs for the battery and the optimal wind turbine.
The depreciation factor of the battery is included to account
for the battery usage cost based on Eq. (12). Simulations are
performed using the battery control algorithm 1 for one year for
both the pricing schemes and with consideration of the battery
depreciation cost.
The sum of individual agents optimal battery capacities and corre-
sponding sum of individual annual bills are determined. Similarly,
the community optimal battery capacity and the corresponding
annual community bill are estimated. The results are shown in
Table 3.
Similar to the wind power case, results show that the commu-
nity battery provides more savings (higher benefits) compared
to the distributed individually-owned batteries. Multiple advan-
tages can be expected from investing in a community battery.
First, community battery requires a lower optimal rated capacity
while providing the same service. Second, a lower annual bill
is achieved by investing in a community battery in both cases
of a flat and dynamic ToU tariffs. However, it is important to
note that a consequent part of the financial savings obtained
from community assets are attributed to the aggregation of the
community consumption. Finally, these results were obtained14
with the same battery cost (per unit of storage) for the communitybattery as for individual batteries, which might not be the case in
a real-world scenario, whereas in practice, the community battery
cost might be lower due to the economies of scale effect.
4.2.2. Fair redistribution of benefits achieved from community shared assets
Results from the techno-economic analysis described in Section 4.2.1
show that the community assets provide more savings (higher benefits)
compared to distributed individually-owned assets. Hence, individual
agents can improve their profitability of investment by joining forces,
regrouping into communities and by co-investing in community assets.
In this section, we compare different methodologies for redistribution
of cost savings from community energy assets, and assess the proposed
new scheme that utilizes the marginal contribution principle.
• Implementation for a community wind turbine only
In Section 4.1.2, we presented a method to redistribute benefits
from community-owned assets. To test the advantages of the
proposed method (denoted below as Method 1), we compare its
benefits with other state-of-the-art methods, denoted below as
Methods 2, 3 and 4. In this scenario, we focus on the case where
a single wind turbine is owned by the community. The following
scenario addresses the case with a community wind turbine and a
community battery. Energy bills of individual agents after redis-
tribution of community savings from a community wind turbine
can be computed by one of the methods listed below:
– Method 1: Individual bills are computed by Eq. (29), where
redistribution is based on the marginal contribution of each
agent.
– Method 2: Individual bills are estimated after the instan-
taneous community wind power 𝑔 (𝑡) is distributed among
individuals based on their instantaneous demand 𝑑𝑖(𝑡). In
other words, the wind power allocated to agent 𝑖 at each
time step is determined as:





The bill of each agent 𝑖 is computed by Eq. (24), where 𝑔𝑖(𝑡)
replaces 𝑔wind/solar(𝑡) in Eqs. (8) and (11).
– Method 3: Individual bills are estimated after the instan-
taneous community wind power 𝑔 (𝑡) is distributed equally
among individuals, as shown below:
𝑔 (𝑡) =
𝑔 (𝑡) (31)𝑖 𝑁
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Sum of individual agents annual bills and annual savings obtained from various redistribution mechanisms for flat tariff of
16 pence/kWh [72].
Redistribution mechanism Sum of individual agents
annual bills after
redistribution (£)
Sum of individual agents
annual bills without asset
(baseline) (£)
Sum of individual agents
annual savings (£)
Method 1 64792 134455 69663
Method 2 64792 134455 69663
Method 3 81997 134455 52458
Method 4 76907 134455 57548Table 5
Sum of individual agents annual bills and annual savings obtained from various redistribution mechanisms for Agile Octopus
dynamic ToU tariff [73].
Redistribution mechanism Sum of individual agents
annual bills after
redistribution (£)
Sum of individual agents
annual bills without asset
(baseline) (£)
Sum of individual agents
annual savings (£)
Method 1 68448 143923 75476
Method 2 68448 143923 75476
Method 3 85924 143923 57999
Method 4 80962 143923 62961Fig. 10. Individual agents yearly bills after redistribution for a flat tariff of 16 pence/kWh [72].with 𝑁 the number of households in the community.
– Method 4: Individual bills are estimated after the instan-
taneous community wind power 𝑔 (𝑡) is distributed among
the individuals based on their annual energy consumption,
as shown below:





where 𝑖(𝑇 ) corresponds to the annual energy consumption











Finally, savings are determined by comparing the sum of annual
bills over the community with the baseline total annual bill
(without assets as shown in Table 1).
In this study, a community wind turbine with an optimal capacity
of 405 kW for a flat tariff, and a 456 kW wind turbine for the
case of dynamic ToU tariffs were considered. These correspond to15
optimal capacities obtained from the scenario with wind turbinesonly in Section 4.2.1 and shown in Table 2). The investment cost
of the community wind turbine was assumed to be shared equally
among the agents.
The sum of individual agents annual bills and total annual savings
after redistribution based on the different methods are shown
in Table 4 for a flat tariff, and Table 5 for a dynamic ToU
tariff. Savings are determined as the difference between annual
bills obtained from the considered redistribution method and the
annual bills from the baseline scenario (as shown in Table 1).
Fig. 10 shows the individual agents annual bills after redistribu-
tion in the case of a flat tariff pricing scheme. In this figure, on
the 𝑋-axis we order the 200 agents (households) in our case-study
community increasingly by their total annual energy consumption
(over all half-hourly periods in a year), while the 𝑌 -axis gives the
annual energy bill of that agent. This representation is useful to
investigate the fairness effects. Intuitively, even in the case when
investing in community generation/storage assets is better for
the community on average, the 4 different redistribution methods
may lead to savings being distributed differently across small and
larger agents.
Applied Energy 287 (2021) 116575S. Norbu et al.Fig. 11. Individual agents yearly bills after redistribution based on Method 1 and Method 2 for a flat tariff of 16 pence/kWh [72].Fig. 12. Individual agents yearly bills after redistribution based on Method 1 and Method 2 for different electricity buying prices (𝜏𝑏) for the flat grid import tariff.Results for both pricing schemes are shown in Tables 4 and 5.
They clearly show that Method 1 and 2 yield to the lowest bill
for the whole community, and thus the greatest savings for almost
every agent. Yet, Method 1 and Method 2 should undergo further
comparison to evaluate the economic fairness in the redistribution
scheme. The comparison between the two methods is illustrated
using the flat tariff pricing scheme shown in Fig. 11.
The crossover point between the Method 1 and Method 2 curves
shows that under Method 1 redistribution scheme, 67% of the
agents can achieve lower annual bill, while only 33% of the
agents obtain lower annual bills under the Method 2 mechanism.
These agents (33%) correspond to households with higher annual
consumption. However, according to Fig. 10, agents with higher16annual consumption are the agents who already obtain the high-
est bill reduction. Since the cost of the community wind turbine
is shared equally among agents, irrespective of their demand
profiles, we argue that, overall, it would be fairer to adopt the
redistribution mechanism provided by Method 1, rather than
Method 2.
While it is true that the 1/3 of largest consumers would prefer
Method 2, as shown in Fig. 11, these large consumers already
make the largest bill savings from joint assets in both methods,
and in practice, having the 2/3 of the smallest households in the
community also making noticeable savings is likely to lead to
greater social acceptance of the scheme (both in financial terms
and in terms of e.g. planning consent to install a wind turbine).
Applied Energy 287 (2021) 116575S. Norbu et al.Fig. 13. Individual agents yearly bills after redistribution based on Method 1 and Method 2 for the Agile Octopus dynamic ToU tariff [73].Fig. 14. Individual agents yearly bills after redistribution based on Method 1 for a flat tariff of 16 pence/kWh [72].Sensitivity analysis of the electricity price: the economic fair-
ness and robustness in the redistribution scheme is further evalu-
ated by comparing Method 1 and Method 2 for different electric-
ity buying prices (𝜏𝑏) for the flat grid import tariff, ranging from 8
pence/kWh to 24 pence/kWh as shown in Fig. 12. The simulation
results for each electricity import price clearly show that the
bills curve for Method 1 and Method 2 cross at the exact same
household number, as for the baseline tariff of 16 pence/kWh.
Therefore, irrespective of the electricity buying prices, 67% of
agents can achieve lower annual bills and thus higher annual
savings under Method 1 redistribution scheme as compared to
Method 2.
Finally, Fig. 13 shows the comparison between the Method 1
and Method 2 for the Agile Octopus dynamic ToU tariff. In Agile
Octopus pricing scheme, the electricity import price varies with17an average price of 15.9 pence/kWh, from minimum price of 2.8
pence/kWh to maximum price of 35 pence/kWh depending on
the wholesale market prices. Similar to the case with flat tariff,
the crossover point between Method 1 and Method 2 curves in
Fig. 13 clearly shows that more than 67% agents can achieve
lower annual bills and thus higher savings under Method 1 redis-
tribution scheme compared to Method 2. Therefore, the proposed
redistribution scheme (Method 1) is fairer than Method 2 for all
import prices studied.
• Implementation for a community wind turbine and commu-
nity battery
In this scenario, savings achieved from the community wind
turbine and community battery along with the aggregation of the
community consumption are redistributed based on the marginal
contribution Method 1 only. Indeed, other methods as Method


















Sum of individual agents annual bills and annual savings obtained from Method 1 for flat tariff of 16 pence/kWh [72] and Agile Octopus
dynamic ToU tariff [73].
Redistribution mechanism
Sum of individual agents
annual bills after
redistribution (£)
Sum of individual agents
annual bills without asset
(baseline) (£)
Sum of individual agents
annual savings (£)
Flat tariff Agile Octopus tariff Flat tariff Agile Octopus tariff Flat tariff Agile Octopus tariff
Method 1 57389 59136 134455 143923 77065 847874 cannot be implemented as they would require to assess the
battery use for each prosumer (corresponding to a percentage of
𝑔 (𝑡)), which is not straightforward as the use of a battery can
correspond to a discharge due to the household’s consumption
needs, but also to a charge due to the lack of consumption from
the household.
In the analysis for a flat tariff, an optimal community wind
turbine capacity of 405 kW and an optimal community battery
capacity of 1342 kWh were considered. For dynamic ToU tariffs,
we assumed an optimal community wind turbine of 456 kW and
a community battery of 1690 kWh (see Tables 2 and 3 obtained
for the scenario with wind turbines only). We also considered
investment costs for both the community wind turbine and the
battery and performed an annual simulation based on the battery
control algorithm 1 and pricing schemes, while also integrating
the battery depreciation cost as in Eq. (12). Investment costs for
community energy assets were shared equally among agents.
Savings 𝛱𝐶 (𝑇 ) from the community wind turbine and commu-
nity battery are redistributed among the agents based on their
marginal contribution 𝛩𝑖(𝑇 ), then the bills for individual agents
are determined by Eq. (29). Finally, the savings are determined by
comparing the sum of these annual bills over the community with
the baseline total annual bill (without assets as shown in Table 1).
The overall sum of individual agents annual bills and total annual
savings after redistribution based on Method 1 are shown in
Table 6 for both pricing schemes. Fig. 14 shows the individual
agents annual bills after redistribution for a flat tariff. In the case
of the community-owned wind turbine only, various state-of-the-
art Methods 2, 3 and 4 listed in this subsection, are available to
allocate the wind power to individual agents. But, these methods
are not applicable to community-owned batteries, as there is no
clear method to split the power from the battery. Yet, there is
still a need to assure fair sharing of the jointly-owned community
renewable generator and storage resources. Hence, the proposed
Method 1 based on the marginal contribution provides an equal
and fair redistribution mechanism to distribute savings from both
the community wind turbine and community battery.
. Conclusions and future work
In this work we investigated a model of a community investment
nd sharing of energy assets, including renewable generation and bat-
ery storage in a market pricing regime of fixed electricity tariffs and
ynamic time of use (ToU) tariffs. A model of a prosumer-based con-
rol algorithm was presented and assessed by incorporating the latest
euristics of battery state of health for both at an individual/prosumer
evel and at a community level. The control algorithm was implemented
or different economic parameters that were altered in order to inves-
igate and realize a sensitivity study on the profitability of batteries at
prosumer level. Results from this work display a good performance
f the heuristic-based scheduling when electricity import prices are
elatively higher than export prices. The simulation analysis (based
n real demand profiles, generation data, physical asset profiles and
mport prices in the United Kingdom at the time of writing) shows that
nvestment in batteries can be an economical feasible proposition, but
his result depends on economic parameters such as the cost of the18battery, the export prices of electricity, but also the type of services
for which the battery can get revenues.
Results from the techno-economic analysis show that community
assets provide more savings (higher benefits) compared to distributed,
individually-owned assets. The advantages from community assets are
multiple. First, community assets require a lower capacity for the same
services, hence potentially a lower cost. Second, community assets
achieve lower annual energy bills for both pricing schemes considered
in the study. The study highlighted the importance for determination
of fair redistribution or allocation of benefits achieved in community
projects. In this vein, we explored a number of benefit redistribution
schemes (four methods in total, based on current practices). We pro-
posed a method based on the marginal contribution of each prosumer,
a key concept that assures fair distribution in coalitional game-theory.
We showed that the proposed scheme achieved better performance than
other methods, while also providing the additional advantage of being
computationally tractable.
In future work, our study can be extended to consider new revenue
streams for batteries such as provision of ancillary services, like fre-
quency and demand response. The current study assumed a negligible
export tariff, that could be integrated in future work to provide a
general case and holistic optimization for energy systems with re-
newable generation. Future work will also consider the exploration
of emerging market structures for energy communities such as local
and peer-to-peer energy markets. Consideration of flexibility services,
integration of physical network constraints in the local energy system,
and finally encoding redistribution schemes into smart contracts ex-
ecuted on blockchain systems [84] are also identified as promising
avenues for future research. Finally, one direction of work we plan
to pursue is exploring the use of our community energy control and
redistribution methods for remote communities, or communities in
developing countries or regions, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa
or parts of Asia. In such settings, energy consumers often do not have
access to a central power grid, or power grid supply is unreliable,
hence community energy projects often provide the only way to access
electricity. The methods proposed in this paper could also be very
relevant for these settings, and we plan to explore their application to
remote and developing regions communities in future work.
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